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The parliamentary elections of 2016 deepened democratization in Georgia and strengthened its institutional mechanisms. They revealed new features of the political process: weakening the importance of the charismatic leader and strengthening the role of political parties and the rationality of the behavior of the electorate. They showed that the routine of politics and elections in Georgia begins.

Three revolutions, one after another, replaced the three post-communist leaders of Georgia: (1) the Round Table and Zviad Gamsakhurdia replaced the communists; (2) Gamsakhurdia's cabinet was replaced by Eduard Shevardnadze, and (3) Mikhail Saakashvili removed Shevardnadze from his post. Each of them changed the fortunes of the country and the nation, but only the last event was tagged as a "revolution." It is obviously viewed as the most important among the three and prompts us to ask whether it is absolutely correct to describe Saakashvili's coming to power as a revolution. Is it not a ploy designed to boost the importance of the regime change in the eyes of the world community and the local population? To answer these questions we should answer another, broader, question: Did the regime change that removed Eduard Shevardnadze and became known as the Rose Revolution have the characteristics of a revolution? By revolution we mean the very specific and profound impact a regime exerts on social order-it is much more than a conflict that replaces the government. A revolution brings about changes in the political, economic, spiritual, and social spheres of the nation's life, which take some time to become obvious and are never immediately manifest the very day after forces come to power which choose to call themselves "revolutionary." The events of November 2003 in Georgia were called a revolution immediately after the coup was completed. During the three years that separate us from that time enough material has been accumulated to assess the nature of the changes that have taken place and were brought about by Mikhail Saakashvili's coming to power. The Rose Revolution is a term prompted by the immediate impressions of the non-constitutional power change in Georgia. A revolution is not merely a particular method of regime change-it is an event of profound importance for the country's economic, social, and political life. Those Western authors who have devoted much time to the theory of revolution and who have written extensively on the subject 1 interpret it as a particular method of regime change that brings more radical results than other seemingly similar actions. A revolution means replacement of the top leaders accomplished by a mass illegitimate movement that results in deep-cutting changes.

There is the opinion that the method by which a political leader is replaced, or his own attitude to his possible loss of power, is part of his political heritage and affects the country's democratic development. If the first leader of a newly formed political system is replaced, this heritage becomes even more important. The point is amply illustrated by fifteen years of Georgia's political independence. It changed its political leaders twice, each time with violence and violations of the Constitution. Each time the change was carried out under democratic banners, and each time authoritarian trends in the country's political system became more pronounced: after coming to power each of the new leaders wanted to preserve it. To achieve this, they sought for economic domination to get a grip on badly needed material and financial resources. So each of the new leaders tried to place private business under his political control. The Georgian Constitution, however, guarantees protection of private property; the new leaders are also limited by the liberal Constitution in many other respects, the country's financial and political dependence on the West, and its desire to integrate into the European structures. This forces each of the new leaders to use methods which will not damage the country's democratic image. Political pressure on the business community became especially obvious after the Rose Revolution; today it is barely concealed and rather harsh.

The United National Movement declared the development of small and medium businesses as one of its main aims and promised to remove the taxation issue, the main irritant, from the agenda. Under Eduard Shevardnadze tax evasion was easy: businessmen and bureaucrats established unofficial relations regarded at the top as a natural development pattern of capitalism and primary accumulation. Businessmen were free to break the law, while bureaucrats seized the moment to grow rich by using their official positions to raise their personal prosperity. Even though the country's leaders alleviated state economic pressure on business, they increased their political and bureaucratic pressure by the same token, making the business community a hostage of the state and its bureaucracy. The latter was not only growing rich on bribes, it wanted large chunks of the businesses as well. Corrupt politicians and top bureaucrats protected the lawbreakers. In other words, while economic coercion was alleviated, pressure from the country's political leaders and corrupt bureaucrats was doubled. Businessmen were naturally displeased: they wanted to wriggle out of the double pressure. At one time, Eduard Shevardnadze used this to tighten his control over the business community and strengthen the social base of his power. After coming to power through a coup that toppled the regime of legitimately elected president Zviad Gamsakhurdia, he badly needed all the support he could master. The deposed president's allies stood opposed to him, while most of the population badly hit by the economic devastation and sliding standard of living posed a serious threat to his political system. To strengthen the regime's economic and social basis, President Shevardnadze assembled a business community out of his friends and political allies and enlisted new allies from among the businessmen connected with his regime. This explains how the National Bank of Georgia squandered credits and damaged the state's interests: advised by highly placed and influential people, its chairman was issuing credits in hard currency to be repaid in depreciated Georgian coupons. Huge capital formed in this way. Being aware that sooner or later he would be called to account, the chairman kept a list of all those who recommended the credit seekers. He shot himself under dubious circumstances during the interrogations. Naturally enough, society refused to accept the official version as true. The members of the top crust were not the only ones to exploit the permissiveness of Shevardnadze's regime: ordinary people who lost their jobs when the Soviet Union fell apart found themselves at the very bottom. Some became petty merchants, others took to smuggling; still others tried to set up small and medium businesses by violating the laws. Permissiveness relieved the state's pressure and let them live.